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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
LOUIS LEE MACIAL, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 920316-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992), and Utah R. Crim. 
P. 26(2)(a), whereby a defendant in a district court criminal action 
may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final judgment and 
conviction for any crime other than a first degree or capital felony. 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and 
constitutional provisions are contained in the text of this brief or 
in the Addendum: 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(b)(ii) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-10 
Utah R. Evid. 609 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV 
Utah Const, art. I, § 10 
Utah Const, art. I, § 12 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the lone black female, a prospective juror who had 
been involved in a discrimination lawsuit, was improperly excluded by 
the prosecutor on the basis that she was "whiny." 
To the extent that a trial court's ruling on the 
proffered explanation of a prosecutor turns on the 
latter's credibility, we agree with the United States 
Supreme Court that "a reviewing court ordinarily 
should give those findings great deference." (Batson 
v. Kentucky, [476 U.S. 79, 98 n.21 (1986)]) Our 
decisions demonstrate, however, "ordinarily" does not 
mean "inevitably": in some cases the reviewing court 
may conclude that the explanation is inherently 
implausible in light of the whole record. And even 
when there is no doubt of the prosecutor's good faith, 
the issue whether a given explanation constitutes a 
constitutionally permissible—i.e. nondiscriminatory— 
justification for the particular peremptory challenge 
remains a question of law. 
People v. Turner, 726 P.2d 102, 107 n.6 (Cal. 1986); Chew v. State, 
562 A.2d 1270, 1276 (Md. App. 1989) ("an appellate court will give 
great deference to the first level findings of fact made by a trial 
judge, but having done so, will make an independent constitutional 
appraisal concerning the existence of neutral, non-racial reasons 
for the striking of a juror"); accord State v. Cantuf 778 P.2d 517 
(Utah 1989); see also 778 P.2d at 519 (Hall, C.J., dissenting) 
(opinion disagreeing with the majority's unwillingness to defer to 
the trial court's findings and conclusion of law); cf. State v. 
Butler, 731 S.W.2d 265, 268 (Mo. App. 1987) ("'Rubber stamp' 
approval of all nonracial explanations, no matter how whimsical or 
fanciful, would cripple Batson's commitment to 'ensure that no 
- 2 -
citizen is disqualified from jury service because of his race/n); 
Gamble v. State, 357 S.E.2d 792, 794 (Ga. 1987). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for three 
counts of "Unlawful Distribution, Offering, Agreeing, Consenting, or 
Arranging to Distribute a Controlled" Substance, all second degree 
felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. sections 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii), 
-(8)(1)(b)(i) (1991), in the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Michael R. 
Murphy, presiding. (R 107-09). On February 26, 1992, a jury found 
Defendant/Appellant Louis Lee Macial guilty of the above entitled 
offenses. (R 107-09). 
For each conviction, the trial court sentenced Mr. Macial 
to an indeterminate term of one-to-fifteen years in the Utah State 
Prison. (R 116-18) (May 4, 1992 sentencing order). The court 
ordered the three sentences to run concurrently with one another. 
Mr. Macial was also ordered to pay $180 in restitution for his 
conviction on count I. (R 116). The court then stayed the 
sentences, releasing Mr. Macial to Adult Probation and Parole for 
thirty-six months. The restitution order remained one of the 
conditions of probation. (R 119). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Of the nineteen people questioned during the jury selection 
process, three were excused for cause, four were peremptorily 
challenged by the State and four were peremptorily challenged by 
- 3 -
Mr. Macial. (R 43). The remaining eight person jury, none of whom 
were apparently persons of color, convicted Louis Macial, a Hispanic 
male, of the three counts alleged in the information. (R 6-7, 43, 
134-204). 
The prosecutor peremptorily challenged Bettye English, the 
only black person in the jury selection pool, because "I [the 
prosecutor] found her, for lack of a better term, to be somewhat 
whiny. I don't think she would be a good juror with the other 
jurors. And that was the sole basis. It had nothing to do with her 
race or anything else." (R 216). The prosecutor did not believe 
that a lawsuit involving Ms. English, which alleged that she "was 
terminated from [her] job through discrimination[,]" was "something 
that was so personal that it would be embarrassing to speak of 
before the group." (R 203, 216). Previously, when the court had 
asked the jurors of their prior involvement in lawsuits, Ms. English 
approached the bench and used a note to explain her situation. The 
court accepted the prosecutor's explanation as a race-neutral 
reason. (R 216). 
The court also determined that "Juror No. 11," a person1 
referred to by number rather than name out of concern for his 
privacy, could not sit as a juror. In a note shown privately to the 
1
 The trial court issued an order, for the purposes of 
appeal, which requested that the record refer to the juror by number 
rather than by name in an effort to protect the juror from the 
embarrassment or humiliation accompanying the public disclosure of 
his prior felony conviction. (R 196-97). Perhaps the same courtesy 
should be extended to Ms. English in light of her feelings of 
"embarrassment." 
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court, juror #11 revealed, "I have been convicted of sale of a 
controled [sic] sub. Exgpounged [sic] 1978." (R 179). 
Following the trial court's reading of the jury selection 
statutes, it concluded that a prior felony conviction disqualified 
juror #11 from jury duty notwithstanding the fact that the crime had 
been expunged. (R 193, 196). The court further ruled that he would 
be biased and could be challenged for cause. (R 194). 
Other facts relevant to the jury selection process are 
contained elsewhere in this brief. See infra Argument. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The State peremptorily challenged Bettye English, the only 
black juror, on the basis that her involvement in a discrimination 
lawsuit was not "something that was so personal that it would be 
embarrassing to speak of before the group." When the court had 
asked the jurors of their prior legal involvement, Ms. English 
approached the bench and used a note to explain her situation, 
rather than through an oral response. 
By comparison, however, when another juror privately 
disclosed his involvement in a prior legal matter with a note, the 
court and the prosecutor recognized his need for privacy. This 
other juror, a convicted felon with an expunged crime, was later 
designated "Juror No.11" out of concern for the public humiliation 
accompanying a reference to him by name through the court record. 
The irony of the disparate treatment cannot be ignored: the 
conviction of a juror, which is often exploited publicly by the 
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prosecution, was deemed to be a legitimate personal matter, but the 
lawsuit of another juror, which involved allegations of 
discriminatory termination, was discounted by the State because it 
did not seem "so personal that it would be embarrassing to speak of 
before the group." Juror No.ll's privacy concerns regarding his 
expunged felony conviction were not cited as a reason for his 
exclusion, while at the same time, Ms. English's privacy concerns 
became a factor relevant to the State's use of its peremptory 
challenge. Privacy concerns should have either been viewed alike or 
ignored altogether. 
A facially neutral rebuttal disclaimer constitutes an 
inadequate legal explanation. Since indirect discriminatory 
peremptory challenges are just as improper as blatant racist 
removals, a prosecutor's explanation must be neutral, related to the 
case being tried, clear and reasonably specific, and legitimate. 
The prosecutor's contention, that the sole black juror was "whiny" 
and would not "be a good juror with the other jurors" was vague and 
speculative. The State's explanation reflected no bias held by 
Ms. English and it was especially unacceptable in light of the 
apparently "pro-prosecution" circumstances in her background. 
Further, even if "whiny" properly characterized her, it was 
unrelated to the case and would have had no bearing on the guilt or 
innocence determination. 
When a juror is improperly excluded, the harmless error 
analysis is inapplicable. Since courts do not invade the province 
of the jury, a new trial is required. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT 
THE PROSECUTOR IMPROPERLY USED ITS PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE 
AGAINST A FEMALE, BLACK JUROR 
In Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. , 113 L.Ed.2d 411, 111 S.Ct. 
1364 (1991), the United Supreme Court reiterated the message of 
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the seminal opinion 
regarding the use of peremptory challenges: 
Batson "was designed 'to serve multiple ends,'" only 
one of which was to protect individual defendants from 
discrimination in the selection of jurors. Batson 
recognized that a prosecutor's discriminatory use of 
peremptory challenges harms the excluded jurors and 
the community at large. 
Powers, 113 L.Ed.2d at 422 (citations omitted); Batson, 476 U.S. 
at 85 n.4 & 99 n.22 ("The standard we adopt under the Federal 
Constitution [U.S. Const, amend. XIV] is designed to ensure that a 
State does not use peremptory challenges to strike any black juror 
because of his race"); accord United States v. David, 803 F.2d 1567, 
1571 (11th Cir. 1986) ("under Batson, the striking of one black 
juror for a racial reason violates the Equal Protection Clause, even 
where other black jurors are seated, and even when valid reasons for 
the striking of some black jurors are shown"); State v. Butler/ 731 
S.W.2d 265, 269 (Mo. App. 1987); Floyd v. State, 539 So.2d 357, 364 
(Ala. Cr. App. 1987). 
Utah's state supreme court has similarly recognized that 
the State's exclusion of even a single juror because of the 
individual's race is offensive. State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 340 
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(Utah 1991) ("The discriminatory peremptory challenge of a minority 
juror simply because a prosecutor believes that the juror's race may 
influence the juror's decision in the case is offensive regardless 
of the defendant's race"); State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591, 595 (Utah 
1988) ("Cantu I") ("The defendant may rely on the fact that the use 
of peremptory challenges permits those who are of mind to 
discriminate to do so"). 
Given the sensitive nature of the involved issues, courts 
have also noted that "an attorney, although not intentionally 
discriminating, may try to find reasons other than race to challenge 
a black juror, when race may be his primary factor in deciding to 
strike the juror." Floyd v. State, 539 So.2d 357, 361 (Ala. Cr. 
App. 1987). Nevertheless, "the trial judge must be careful not to 
confuse a specific reason given by the state's attorney for his 
challenge, with a 'specific bias' of the juror, which may justify 
the peremptory challenge." Id. (emphasis added). 
As discussed below, the trial court in the case at bar 
erred when it mistakenly accepted the prosecutor's specified 
reason—that the female black juror was "whiny"—even though Ms. 
Bettye English's alleged whininess reflected no bias whatsoever as 
it pertained to the facts of the case. The prosecutor also failed 
to provide a clear and distinct, legitimately, related basis. 
A. THE APPLICABLE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
In State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769 (Utah App. 1991), the 
opinion set forth five considerations relevant to a peremptory 
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challenge analysis: (1) standing; (2) a proper objection; (3) a 
prima facie showing of improper discrimination; (4) the rebuttal 
explanation; and (5) the prejudicial effect. Id. at 774. 
However, as predicted by the opinion, the Powers decision 
rejected "racial identity with excluded jurors as a standing 
requirement for such objections." 805 P.2d at 775 (citing Powers, 
113 L.Ed.2d 411); Span, 819 P.2d at 340 ("no standing requirement 
exists which requires the defendant to be of the same race as the 
challenged juror"). 
The second and third considerations similarly require no 
analysis because: 
once a party accused of improper discrimination 
attempts to rebut that accusation with evidence that 
the challenged action was proper, the question of 
whether a prima facie case was made in the first place 
"is no longer relevant." Instead, the focus shifts to 
the ultimate issue of whether improper discrimination 
has occurred. 
Harrison, 805 P.2d at 777 (citations omitted); accord Williams v. 
State, 548 So.2d 501, 504 (Ala. Cr. App. 1988) ("We follow the rule 
that, when the prosecution's explanations for its strikes are of 
record, we will review the trial court's findings of discrimination 
vel non, even though there has been no express finding by the trial 
court that a prima facie case has been established"); Gamble v. 
State, 357 S.E.2d 792, 794 (Ga. 1987). 
In regards to the fourth consideration, the adequacy of the 
rebuttal, "[r]elying on Batson, it has been found that an 
explanation given by a prosecutor for the exercise of a peremptory 
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challenge must be '(1) neutral, (2) related to the case being tried, 
(3) clear and reasonably specific, and (4) legitimate.'" State v. 
Cantu, 778 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah 1989) ("Cantu II") (citing State v. 
Butler, 731 S.W.2d 265, 268 (Mo. App. 1987)); Gamble, 357 S.E.2d 
at 795.2 The prosecutor's explanation in the present case did not 
meet the necessary requirements. 
When the court had asked the jurors about their prior 
involvement in lawsuits, Ms. English requested to approach the bench 
and then responded to the court's inquiry with a note: "I, Bettye 
English, was attempting to sue the Board of Education because I was 
terminated from my job through discrimination because I did not have 
EEO involved — " (R 203). After the State had been apprised of the 
note's contents, the prosecutor reacted: "I felt, based on her 
unwillingness to speak before the rest of the group about a matter 
2
 Other comparable factors cast doubt upon the legitimacy 
of a purportedly race-neutral explanation: 
We agree that the presence of one or more of these 
factors will tend to show that the state's reasons are 
not actually supported by the record or are an 
impermissible pretext: (1) alleged group bias not 
shown to be shared by the juror in question, (2) 
failure to examine the juror or perfunctory 
examination, assuming neither the trial court nor 
opposing counsel had questioned the juror, (3) 
singling the juror out for special questioning 
designed to evoke a certain response, (4) the 
prosecutor's reason is unrelated to the facts of the 
case, and (5) a challenge based on reasons equally 
applicable to juror [sic] who were not challenged. 
Cantu II, 778 P.2d at 518-19 (quoting State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18, 
22 (Fla. 1988)); Floyd v. State, 539 So.2d 357, 362 (Ala. App. 1987). 
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that I didn't find — I'm sure she felt that it was personal, 
naturally, but her note indicated she had a lawsuit against the 
school district. I didn't see it to be something that was so 
personal that it would be embarrassing to speak of before the group.11 
(R 216). 
B. THE PROSECUTOR'S EXPLANATION WAS NOT RACE 
NEUTRAL BECAUSE SIMILARLY SITUATED JURORS 
WERE TREATED DIFFERENTLY 
The prosecutor's explanation must remain consistent with 
the treatment extended similarly situated jurors. See State v. 
Butler, 731 S.W.2d 265, 271 (Mo. App. 1987) (conflicting reasons do 
not suffice because "[t]he prosecutor cannot have in both ways"); 
People v. Turner, 726 P.2d 102, 109 (Cal. 1986); cf. Floyd v. State, 
539 So.2d 357, 362-63 (Ala. Cr. App. 1987) (disparate treatment of 
the prospective jurors is improper). 
In the case at bar, two jurors disclosed their involvement 
in a legal matter with a written note rather than through an oral 
response. Bettye English, the lone black juror, revealed her 
involvement in a discrimination lawsuit with a note. (R 203). 
Immediately after Ms. English had submitted her note, "Juror No. 11" 
approached the bench and conveyed a message of his own. (R 162).3 
Although juror #11 was subsequently excused, neither the court nor 
3
 See supra note 1. A distinction should also be noted 
that, in contrast to viewing juror #ll,s written note as a personal 
matter which should have been revealed to the public, both the 
prosecutor and the court instead focused on whether juror #11's 
expunged felony conviction disqualified him as a juror. (R 179-99). 
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the prosecutor viewed juror #11's written message as an improper 
attempt to protect his privacy. 
Juror #11 is the convicted felon, an individual whose past 
history is typically emphasized by the prosecution and exposed in 
court for purposes of trial (e.g. impeachment) and sentencing 
(e.g. arrest record). See, e.g., Utah R. Evid. 609; Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 76-3-201, -401. Notwithstanding the prosecution's contention 
that he "didn't [view Ms. English's lawsuit as] "something that was 
so personal that it would be embarrassing to speak of before the 
group[,]" (R 216), juror #ll,s expunged felony conviction was, by 
comparison, atypically viewed as a personal and potentially 
embarrassing past legal matter worthy of protection. See (R 179-80; 
185; 194-97). 
Ms. English and juror #11 were treated differently, even 
though they had both revealed a personal legal matter with a note. 
The references to Ms. English's sensitivity and her reluctance to 
speak in public contrasts with the compassion extended juror #11, a 
convict whose past often becomes the subject of an "on-the-record" 
inquiry and humiliation. The jurors' past legal involvement— 
regardless of whether it pertained to a felony offense or a 
discrimination case—should have been viewed alike, and not as a 
potentially embarrassing situation for one juror and as a 
circumstance unrelated to the exclusion of another. Unlike the 
court's ability to seal and protect a convicted juror from the 
public disclosure of his crime, the improperly accepted peremptory 
challenge subjected Ms. English to open humiliation beyond that 
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already experienced in her discrimination lawsuit. Georgia v. 
McCollum, 505 U.S. , 120 L.Ed.2d 33, 44, 112 S.Ct. 2348 (1992) 
("Regardless of who invokes the discriminatory challenge, . . . the 
juror is subjected to open and public racial discrimination"); 
Powers, 113 L.Ed.2d at 427 ("A venireperson excluded from jury 
service because of race suffers a profound personal humiliation 
heightened by its public character11); see supra note 1. 
C. THE PROSECUTOR'S EXPLANATION LACKED CLARITY, 
SPECIFICITY, AND LEGITIMACY 
The prosecutor also deemed Ms. English, "for lack of a 
better term, to be somewhat whiny. I don't think she would be a 
good juror with the other jurors. And that was the sole basis. It 
had nothing to do with her race or anything else." (R 216). The 
court sided with the prosecutor: 
THE COURT: All right. You have made the record. I 
mean — well, what [the prosecutor] has said to me, to 
my mind, justifies, for reasons other than race, his 
peremptory challenge. What he has said here 
corresponded with my observations of Ms. English's 
demeanor, and that's why I ruled that the reasons 
stated by [the prosecutor] are not made up, they are 
not pretentious but, in fact, made sense to me. That 
is the reason he did what he did rather than doing it 
for reasons of race. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Perhaps I ought to respond to 
that, because my perception of her demeanor was 
nothing like that. Of course, we all have different 
perspectives. 
(R 216-17). 
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1. The prosecutor failed to cite a specific 
"bias" of the juror 
"[T]he trial judge must be careful not to confuse a 
specific reason given by the state's attorney for his challenge, 
with a 'specific bias/ of the juror, which may justify the 
peremptory challenge." Floyd v. State, 539 So.2d 357, 361 (Ala. Cr. 
App. 1987) (emphasis added); State v. Cantu, 778 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah 
1989) (construing People v. Hall, 672 P.2d 854, 857 (1983) 
("peremptories must be based on grounds reasonably related to case 
on trial or for reasons of specific bias")); see also People v. 
Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 (1978). The trial court,s focus in the case 
at bar was misplaced. No bias was suggested in the prosecutor's 
response. 
Other than the generalized questions addressed to the jury 
pool as a whole, the State asked no questions of Ms. English which 
could have tested her impartiality. Cf. People v. Turner, 726 P.2d 
102, 111 (Cal. 1986) (citation omitted) ("A prosecutor's failure to 
engage Black prospective jurors 'in more than desultory voir dire, 
or indeed to ask them any questions at all,' before striking them 
peremptorily, is one factor supporting an inference that the 
challenge is in fact based on group bias"); Cantu II, 778 P.2d 
at 518 (quoting Slappy, 522 So.2d at 22 ("factors that may cast 
doubt upon the legitimacy of a purportedly race-neutral explanation 
[include the] . . . failure to examine the juror or perfunctory 
examination, assuming neither the trial court nor opposing counsel 
had questioned the juror, . . .")); Butler, 731 S.W.2d at 269 
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("Without some form of inquiry, a prosecutor could easily conceal 
his true reason for removing black jurors by simply inventing 
'neutral' reasons for the strikes11); Floyd, 539 So.2d at 362. 
Absent the detection of bias and because of the lack of questioning, 
the State provided no legitimate reason for Ms. English's exclusion. 
2. The prosecutor failed to state a clear and 
reasonably specific explanation 
The State's assertion of Ms. English being "whiny" is so 
broad and nebulous that it failed to satisfy the "clear and 
reasonably specific" requirement for race-neutral explanations. See 
Cantu II, 778 P.2d at 518; Williams v. State, 548 So.2d 501, 504 
(Ala. Cr. App. 1988); £f. People v. Turner, 726 P.2d 102, 110 (Cal 
1986) ("the assertion that 'something in her work' would 'not be 
good for the People's case' is so lacking in content as to amount to 
virtually no explanation"); Williams, 548 So.2d at 507 ("The 
prosecutor's reasoning that she was 'docile' during voir dire 
questioning and was 'lacking the strength of conviction it would 
take to sit in judgment in a case of this magnitude' is also 
doubtful"); Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("A 
prosecutor's own conscious or unconscious racism may lead him easily 
to the conclusion that a prospective black juror is 'sullen,' or 
'distant,' a characterization that would not have come to his mind 
if a white juror had acted identically"). Moreover, the 
prosecutor's allegation was expressly rejected by defense counsel 
who stated, "my perception of her demeanor was nothing like that." 
(R 216-17). 
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Indeed, since Bettye English possessed a background 
apparently favorable to the prosecution, the State's decision to 
exclude the black juror merely because of her alleged "whininess" 
casts further doubt upon the legitimacy of the explanation. 
Ms. English has a daughter who works for the FBI and a son who "had 
an electric car stolen from the house, and someone broke into his 
truck and took a jack and CB and stuff like that." (R 164, 168). 
The State should not have been allowed to exclude her. Cf. Turner, 
726 P.2d at 106 (citation omitted) ("On voir dire neither had 
expressed any views indicating partiality to the defense; on the 
contrary, both prospective jurors 'had backgrounds which suggested 
that, had they been white, the prosecution would not have 
peremptorily excused them,n); see also (R 140-53) (Ms. English, [who 
was a wife, a mother, and a grandparent], possessed characteristics 
common to other jurors who were not excluded). 
In addition, the prosecutor's claim that Ms. English "would 
[not] be a good juror with the other jurors" finds no support in the 
record and is a more nebulous "conclusory nuance" than the "whiny" 
characterization. See People v. Washington, 234 Cal.Rptr. 204 (Cal. 
App. 4 Dist. 1987) (reversal required because the prosecutor's 
contentions that the juror—who "spoke softly," "would not be able 
to speak up [or to stand up] to the other jurors," and "didn't 
appear to be a decision maker"—was "neither supported by the record 
nor the law"); Williams, 548 So.2d at 506-07 ("The speculation that 
her [the prospective juror] having heard of appellant might 
prejudice her against the prosecution is just that—speculation 
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. . . [and her] connection, possibly negative, with 'law 
enforcement,' . . . also appears to be nothing more than speculation 
and is unsupported by voir dire examination"); Butler, 731 S.W.2d 
at 272 (prosecutor cannot speculate that because nurses are 
generally compassionate, the involved nurse would also be "inclined 
to feel sorry for defendants"). The State's rebuttal explanation 
failed to set forth a legitimate, race-neutral explanation. 
D. THE PROSECUTOR FAILED TO STATE A REASON 
RELATED TO THE CASE BEING TRIED 
"Nor may the prosecutor rebut the defendants case merely 
by denying that he had a discriminatory motive or 'affirm[ing] [his] 
good faith in making individual selections.' . . . The prosecutor 
therefore must articulate a neutral explanation related to the 
particular case to be tried." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 
(1986) (citation omitted); State v. Cantu, 778 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah 
1989) (quoting State v. Butler, 731 S.W.2d 265, 268 (Mo. App. 1987) 
("an explanation given by a prosecutor for the exercise of a 
peremptory challenge must be . . . 'related to the case being 
tried, . . . , n)); Gamble v. State, 357 S.E.2d 792, 795 (Ga. 1987); 
Williams v. State, 548 So.2d 501, 504 (Ala. Cr. App. 1988); State v. 
Slappy, 522 So.2d 18, 22 (Fla. 1988); Floyd v. State, 539 So.2d 357, 
362 (Ala. App. 1987). 
As alluded to above, a female, black juror's alleged 
whininess is in no way relevant to a specific bias or to his or her 
ability to follow the law. Even if the characteristic befitted 
Ms. English's disposition, the State's purported and unrelated 
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justification fails. See, e.g., Butler, 731 S.W.2d at 272; Gamble, 
357 S.E.2d at 796 ("The prosecutor's explanation that [the 
prospective juror] is a Mason is unpersuasive [as] [i]t is not clear 
how Masonic membership is related to this case"); Hill v. State, 787 
S.W.2d 74, 78 (Tex. App. 1990) (reversal required when, in addition 
to striking a prospective juror because of his race, the 
prosecutor's explanations were based on assumptions and reasons 
unrelated to the case such as "I just didn't like the way he 
responded to my questions, his attitude, his demeanor"). 
E. THE COURT ERRED IN ITS ACCEPTANCE OF THE 
PROSECUTION'S REBUTTAL EXPLANATION 
Indirect discrimination4 is no more tolerable than blatant 
racism. Compare State v. Cantu, 778 P.2d 517, 519 (Utah 1989) 
4
 The subtle forms of improperly exercised peremptory 
challenges have also been recognized: 
Nor is outright pervarication . . . the only danger 
here. "[I]t is even possible that an attorney may lie to 
himself in an effort to convince himself that his motives 
are legal." . . . A prosecutor's own conscious or 
unconscious racism may lead him easily to the conclusion 
that a prospective black juror is "sullen," or "distant," a 
characterization that would not have come to his mind if a 
white juror had acted identically. A judge's own conscious 
or unconscious racism may lead him to accept such an 
explanation as well supported. . . . [Prosecutors' 
peremptories are based on their "seat-of-the-pants 
instincts." . . . Yet "seat-of-the-pants instincts" may 
often be just another term for racial prejudice. Even if 
all parties approach the Court's mandate with the best of 
conscious intentions, that mandate requires them to 
confront and overcome their own racism on all levels. . . 
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986) (Marshall, J., 
concurring), reprinted in State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18, 22-23 (Fla. 
1988). 
- 18 -
(emphasis added) ("we hold that race was an indirect but significant 
reason for the peremptory challenge and vacate defendant's 
conviction"), with Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. , 120 L.Ed.2d 
33, 44, 112 S.Ct. 2348 (1992) (the Constitution prohibits purposeful 
discrimination on the ground of race in the exercise of peremptory 
challenges). While the prosecutor's actions did not appear to be 
ill-willed, his stated justifications nonetheless failed to meet the 
necessary legal standards. 
The trial court must not "discharge its duty to inquire 
into and carefully evaluate the explanations offered by the 
prosecutor[.]" People v. Turner, 726 P.2d 102, 112 (Cal. 1986); 
Floyd, 539 So.2d at 362 ("intuitive judgment or suspicion by the 
prosecutor [is not enough and there is a] . . . danger [in] taking 
the explanations at face value rather than scrutinizing them 
carefully"); Williams, 548 So.2d at 504 ("When evaluating the 
reasons, the trial court had a duty to reject any explanation that 
did not meet these [the above] requirements"). 
The court here may have agreed with the prosecutors 
assessment of Ms. English, but an apparently facially neutral 
explanation must still meet the necessary legal requirements. In 
light of the circumstances discussed above, her allegedly "whiny" 
demeanor failed to clearly and specifically state a legitimate 
race-neutral justification. 
F. THE HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS IS INAPPLICABLE 
TO THE CASE AT BAR 
The fifth consideration announced in the Harrison decision, 
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a harmless error analysis, is not actually supported by the cited 
authority. The Harrison opinion read in relevant part: 
if we had found clear error, Harrison,s conviction 
could be affirmed only by showing that the error was 
"harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 
L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (quoted in Cantu I, 750 P.2d 
at 597.) This is a difficult showing to make, and 
prosecutors who are questioned in the future about 
possibly improper peremptory juror challenges would do 
well to consider this in formulating their responses, 
making sure that they meet the Batson requirements. 
State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 780 (Utah App. 1991) (footnote 
omitted). 
The unprecedented proposed language from Cantu I was 
supported only by a single justice in a plurality opinion. See 
Cantu I, 750 P.2d at 597 (Howe, J.). While the other members of the 
court were able to agree that the case should be remanded, in a 
fragmented set of opinions the court could not agree on what should 
occur upon remand. See id. at 597-98. Moreover, in the subsequent 
Cantu II opinion, no harmless error analysis was followed or even 
mentioned. See Cantu II, 778 P.2d at 519. Instead, the Utah 
Supreme Court explained: 
the fact that the juror was Hispanic was the ultimate 
predicate for the prosecutor's peremptory challenge. 
This reason for exclusion of the juror is neither 
neutral nor legitimate. Therefore, we hold that race 
was an indirect but significant reason for the 
peremptory challenge and vacate defendant's 
conviction. The matter is remanded for a new trial. 
778 P.2d at 519. 
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The analysis there is consistent with the holding of Batson 
and its progeny. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 
(1986) (emphasis added) (if "the prosecutor does not come forward 
with a neutral explanation for his action, our precedents require 
that petitioner's conviction be reversed"); Powers, 113 L.Ed.2d 
at 426 (no harmless error analysis is required because "we find that 
a criminal defendant suffers a real injury when the prosecutor 
excludes jurors at his or her own trial on account of race" and 
because "[a] prosecutor's wrongful exclusion of a juror by a 
race-based peremptory challenge is a constitutional violation 
committed in open court at the outset of the proceedings"); cf. 
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. , 113 L.Ed.2d 302, 321, 111 S.Ct. 
1246 (1991) (citing Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986) (no 
harmless error analysis for "structural errors" such as the 
"unlawful exclusion of members of the defendant's race from the 
grand jury that indicted him, despite overwhelming evidence of his 
guilt")); People v. Turner, 726 P.2d 102, 112-113 (Cal 1986) 
(Vasquez's reasoning is even more applicable, of course, to the 
systematic exclusion of Blacks from the jury that actually tried and 
convicted the defendant in the case at bar"); Powers, 113 L.Ed.2d 
at 428 (citing Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 107 L.Ed.2d 905, 
110 S.Ct. 803 (1990) ("race-based exclusion is no more permissible 
at the individual petit jury stage than at the venire stage")). 
As the above authority indicates, the harm extends beyond 
its effect on the defendant. "The purpose of the jury system is to 
impress upon the criminal defendant and the community as a whole 
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that a verdict of conviction or acquittal is given in accordance 
with the law by persons who are fair. The verdict will not be 
accepted or understood . . . if the jury is chosen by unlawful means 
at the outset." Powers, 113 L.Ed.2d at 426 (emphasis added); see 
also State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d 765, 768 (1980) (emphasis added) 
("The State claims that the defendant has not proved he was 
prejudiced when he used his peremptory challenges to remove the 
challenged jurors. However, defendant cannot prove this 
empirically, and he is not required to do so"). 
Viewed another way, appellate courts have repeatedly 
refused to assume the fact finding role of the jury because a 
reading of the "cold record" cannot substitute for the jury's first 
hand observation of the witnesses and the events perceived in the 
"heat of trial." See, e.g., State v. Underwood, 737 P.2d 995, 996 
(Utah 1987) (per curiam) (citations omitted) ("In reviewing a 
defendant's conviction, we do not substitute our judgment for that 
of the jury. It is the exclusive function of the jury to weigh the 
evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses"). For 
reasons unknown, a single individual who was excluded as a 
prospective juror could have affected the entire decision making 
process. Cf. Bailey, 605 P.2d at 768 (construing Crawford v. 
Manning, 542 P.2d 1091, 1093 (Utah 1975) (in "a civil case where six 
of eight jurors could return a verdict, a similar error was held not 
harmless although there was a unanimous verdict, because the juror 
who remained when the appellant exhausted his peremptory challenges 
'may have been a hawk amid seven doves and imposed his will upon 
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them'")); Utah Const, art. I, § 10 ("In criminal cases the verdict 
shall be unanimous"); see also State v. Julian, 771 P.2d 1061, 1064 
(Utah 1989) ("This Court has repeatedly held that it is prejudicial 
error to compel a party to exercise a peremptory challenge to remove 
a prospective juror who should properly have been removed for 
cause"). 
A harmless error analysis is improper because an appellate 
court cannot truly recreate and retroactively perceive the 
circumstances pertinent to an individual's (or the collective 
jury's) deliberations. Questions of guilt or innocence are properly 
left for a trial by jury. Utah Const, art. I, § 12 (emphasis added) 
("In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to . . . 
trial by an impartial jury . . . " ) ; Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-10 ("In a 
jury trial, questions of law are to be determined by the court, 
questions of fact by the jury"). 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse his 
conviction and remand for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this J^ day of September, 1992. 
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ADDENDUM 
58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties^ 
hibited acts A — Penalties: , 
l&iii) possess a controlled substance in the course of his business as 
% sales representative of a manufacturer or distributor of substances 
listed in Schedules II through V except that he may possess such 
controlled subst*m«*« when thev are prescribed to him by a licensed 
practitioner; or 
53£Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is guilty of a second 
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction of Subsec-
tion (l)(a) is guilty of a first degree felony, 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof^  are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
FebeZLKL* UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE Rule 609 
Rule 609. Impeachment by evidence of conviction of 
crime. 
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, 
evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited 
from him or established by public record during cross-examination but only if 
the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year 
under the law under which he was convirted^ancj^e court determines that 
the probative value of admitting this evidenc^btitweighs its prejudicial effect 
to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of 
the punishment 
PART 2 
SENTENCING 
76-3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed 
— Civil penalties — Restitution — Definitions — 
Resentencing — Aggravation or mitigation of 
crimes with mandatory sentences. 
(1) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a 
person adjudged guilty of an offense to any one of the following sentences or 
combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal from or disqualification of public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; or 
(e) to death. 
(2) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to 
forfeit property, dissolve a corporation, suspend or cancel a license, or permit 
removal of a person from office, cite for contempt, or impose any other civil 
penalty. A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(3) (a) (i) When a person is adjudged guilty of criminal activity which has 
resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it 
may impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitu-
PART 4 
LIMITATIONS AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS ON 
SENTENCES 
76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences — Limita-
tions. 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more 
than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sen-
tences for the offenses. Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently 
unless the court states in the sentence that they shall run consecutively. 
(2) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and 
the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determin-
ing whether to impose consecutive sentences. 
77-17-10. Court to determine law; the jury, the facts. 
(1) In a jury trial, questions of law are to be determined by the court, 
questions of feet by the jury. 
(2) The jury may find a general verdict which includes questions of law as 
well as fact but they are bound to follow the law as stated by the court. 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
ARTICLE I 
DECLARATION OF 
RIGHTS 
Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In courts of 
general jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors. 
In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors, In criminal 
cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors 
may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded. 
Sec. 12. [Eights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear 
and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of 
the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own 
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compul-
sory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, 
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or dis-
trict in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the 
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, 
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure 
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify 
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person 
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
